I explore the behavior of asset prices and the exchange rate in a two-country world. When the large country has bad news, the relative price of the small country's output declines. As a result, the small country's bonds are risky, and uncovered interest parity fails, with positive excess returns available to investors who borrow at the large country's interest rate and lend at the small country's interest rate.
An extensive literature has documented the fact that interest-rate differentials across countries are not, on average, counteracted by offsetting currency movements. As a result, it is possible to earn excess returns by investing in high-interest-rate currencies and borrowing in low-interest-rate currencies. This paper presents a simple two-country model in which this failure of uncovered interest parity (UIP)-also known as the forward premium puzzle-emerges in equilibrium. The outputs of the two countries are imperfect substitutes for one another, so units matter, and there are two separate term structures of interest rates, one for each good. Global financial markets are assumed to be perfectly integrated; assets are real rather than nominal, and are priced as if by a representative global investor with power utility; there are no non-tradable goods, no liquidity issues, no portfolio constraints.
Even so, UIP fails to hold. Suppose, for example, that both countries have the same distribution of output growth, and that one country is much smaller than the other.
In equilibrium, the smaller country has a higher short-term real interest rate. (Hassan (2009) documents that small countries tend to have higher nominal interest rates.) As a result, UIP fails, since the small country's exchange rate does not depreciate enough, on average, to offset the interest-rate differential. In fact, on the contrary, the exchange rate is expected to appreciate-an example of Siegel's (1972) "paradox"-so UIP fails in the strong sense that this expected appreciation actually increases the expected excess return on the carry trade.
Why does the smaller country have a higher interest rate? Any risk-based explanation must provide a story for why the small country's bond underperforms in bad states of the world. In the model considered here, bad states are those in which the large country experiences low output growth, since its output contributes the majority of the representative investor's consumption. But bad news for the large country corresponds to an increase in the relative supply of the small country's good, and so to a depreciation in its exchange rate. This depreciation also causes the small-country bond to underperform; hence the risk premium. Panel 1a plots the paths of exogenous fundamentals: the outputs, or dividends, produced by the two countries. Initially, the larger country (black line) contributes 80% of global output.
2 After about 0.6 years, it experiences a disaster that causes its output to drop; the smaller country experiences a similar disaster after about 1.5 years.
The panels below show how the behavior of perpetuity prices depends on the elasticity of substitution between goods, η, with the large country's bond in black and the small country's bond in red. The left-hand column sets η = 1, so that consumption is a
Cobb-Douglas aggregator of the two goods. Panels 1b and 1e illustrate the well-known feature of the Cobb-Douglas setup that bond prices are constant in their own currency, despite the large shocks each country experiences. On the other hand, the exchange rate is extremely volatile, so for example the price of the large country's bond, denominated in the small country's units, jumps up when the large country experiences its output disaster. The right-hand column shows the other extreme, in which the two goods are perfect substitutes. The exchange rate effect disappears: panels 1d and 1g show that bond prices in the perfect substitutes case are the same-and time-varying-in each set of units. Put crudely, in the Cobb-Douglas case all the action is in exchange rates and none in valuation ratios, in conflict with the empirical evidence that movements in valuation ratios are a major driver of movements in asset prices; 3 and in the perfect substitutes case all the action is in valuation ratios and none in exchange rates.
In between, both effects are present. Panel 1c shows that in large country units, exchange rate movements exacerbate the poor performance of the small country's bond countries, I use this i.i.d. example throughout the paper so that all correlations and asymmetries that emerge do so endogenously. 2 The example is set up so that the exchange rate initially equals 1: thus the large country's time-0 output share, in common units, is 4/(4 + 1) = 0.8. In the notation that will be introduced below-and labelling the small country as country 1, with a 20% output share-s 0 = w = 0.2. 3 See, for example, Campbell and Ammer (1993), or Cochrane (2008) for a recent survey.
when the large country suffers its disaster. As a result, the small bond is riskier than the large bond, and so the overall level of the small bond's price is lower, reflecting higher interest rates in the small country and hence the emergence of a carry trade. Notice, also, that the carry trade experiences severe underperformance at times of large-country disaster. Panel 1f shows the corresponding plots viewed in small country units. The large country's disaster reduces the relative supply of its good, so its currency appreciates.
In small-country units, the large country's bond therefore outperforms at the time of disaster and hence is a hedge, so earns a negative excess return.
The price-dividend ratios of the output claims associated with each of the two countries also depend on the relative size of the two economies, as in Martin (2009a) : if, say, the larger country experiences bad output news then the other country's output share increases. Its output claim is now riskier-more correlated with consumption growth-and so requires a higher excess return and a lower price-dividend ratio. In this way, shocks to one country affect asset valuations in the other country. Furthermore, if goods are imperfect substitutes, then the small country's currency depreciates when the large country experiences bad output news, as before. This amplifies the underperformance of the small-country output claim in large-country units. Figure 5 , in the Appendix, illustrates this, using the same sample paths for output as Figure 1 .
To what extent are these effects dependent on the particular numerical example chosen? Less than one might think: the failure of UIP, within the model, occurs in any calibration, and I also provide economically interpretable nonparametric conditions under which I am able to sign the direction in which UIP fails-that is, to show when it is the small country whose bonds are risky, as in the example above. Frankel (1980) , Hodrick (1980), and Fama (1984) are amongst the early contributions to the literature on the forward premium puzzle. More recently, Brunnermeier, Nagel and Pedersen (2008) and Jurek (2009) and Obstfeld (1991 ), Zapatero (1995 , Pavlova and Rigobon (2007) , and Stathopoulos (2009) also explore the consequences of intratemporal price adjustment, but all four papers rely on assumptions of log utility and unit elasticity of substitution between goods in deriving their analytical results.
The next section discusses UIP and the forward premium puzzle, and lists some necessary ingredients of any model in which UIP fails to hold. Section 2 sets up the model, which contains these ingredients. Section 3 characterizes asset prices, the exchange rate, and expected returns. Section 4 considers the small-country limit. Section 5 concludes.
All proofs are in the Appendix.
UIP and the forward premium puzzle
UIP is a conjectured relationship between next year's spot exchange rate between two countries, e t+1 , today's spot exchange rate, e t , and 1-year interest rates in each country, i 1,t and i 2,t :
E log e t+1 = log e t + i 1,t − i 2,t .
The thought behind (1) is this: if country 2 has a lower interest rate than country 1, surely this should be compensated by the expected appreciation of its currency?
Unfortunately this natural idea is decisively rejected by the data: in the relationship log e t+1 − log e t = a 0 + a 1 (i 1,t − i 2,t ) + ε t+1 ,
UIP holds if a 0 = 0 and a 1 = 1. Typically, however, a 1 is estimated to be close to zero, or even negative.
An equivalent formulation of the UIP relationship exploits covered interest parity, which is the no-arbitrage relationship between today's 1-year forward exchange rate, f t , today's spot exchange rate, and the two countries' 1-year rates: log f t = log e t +i 1,t −i 2,t .
This shows that (1) is equivalent to E log e t+1 = log f t . The failure of UIP can therefore be rephrased as the failure of forward exchange rates to be unbiased predictors of future exchange rates.
We can also use the fact that e t+1 /e t = M 2,t+1 /M 1,t+1 -where M i,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor that prices assets denominated in the units of country i, i = 1, 2-to gain some understanding of necessary ingredients of models that generate the violation of UIP. For, we can take logs then expectations to conclude that, as an identity,
Now, if M 1,t+1 and M 2,t+1 were roughly constant-as would be the case if either there were little risk in the economy, or if investors were roughly risk-neutral-then we could approximate (3) by
That is, UIP can be formally justified in economies in which either the price or quantity of risk is very low. Empirically, however, high Sharpe ratios-the equity premium puzzle-tell us that the stochastic discount factors M i,t+1 are volatile. Thus the move from (3) to (4) was not justified, and we must take the effects of Jensen's inequality into account, arriving at the identity
The terms L t (M i,t+1 ) measure the variability of the SDFs; following Backus, Chernov and Martin (2010) , I call L t (M i,t+1 ) the entropy of M i,t+1 . High SDF entropy trans-lates into high attainable expected risk-adjusted returns, much as high SDF volatility translates into high attainable Sharpe ratios (Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) ).
The identity (5) reveals some necessary ingredients of any model in which UIP fails to hold (a point originally made in different notation by Fama (1984) , and later revisited by Backus, Foresi and Telmer (2001) ). First, as discussed, the entropies of M 1,t+1 and M 2,t+1 must be non-zero and economically significant: risk must matter. Second, there must be an asymmetry: if the entropies were equal they would cancel out, returning us to a world in which UIP held. Third, to generate the patterns found when estimating
) should be small at times when i 1,t − i 2,t is high: if a country has high interest rates then assets denominated in its currency should earn relatively low risk premia. The model that follows has these properties.
Setup
There are two countries with output streams {D 1t } and {D 2t } respectively, at least one of which is nondeterministic. I assume that global markets are perfectly integrated, so assets are priced by a representative global investor with expected utility
where C t is the consumption aggregator
Here w controls the relative importance of goods 1 and 2, and η is the elasticity of intratemporal substitution between the goods of the two assets. Write
) for the intratemporal price of a unit of good 2 in units of good 1, and Brandt, Cochrane and Santa-Clara (2006) . For consistency with these papers, I will refer to e t as the exchange rate. When the relative supply of country 2's good declines, its relative price-the exchange rate e t -increases.
The price at time t of asset i, in units of good i ("in i-units") is
from Lucas's (1978) Euler equation. It is important to emphasize that the perturbation logic underlying (6) implies that the price P it is denominated in units of good i. I use stars to indicate a price not expressed in its own units: P * 2t = P 2t e t and P * 1t = P 1t /e t . Similarly, the price of a perpetuity, or consol bond, that pays out a constant stream of good i dividends at a rate of one per unit time, is (in own units)
The outputs of the two countries, D 1t and D 2t , are taken as exogenous-though they could also be thought of as being determined by a production side of the economy that is left unmodelled here-and are assumed to have dividend growth that is i.i.d. over time,
though not necessarily across countries. Formally,
a Lévy process for i = 1, 2. The relevant properties of the dividend growth processes are conveniently summarized by the cumulant-generating function (CGF) c(
5 5 Cumulants and cumulant-generating functions are also discussed by Backus, Foresi and Telmer One of the main themes of the paper is that by exploiting general properties of CGFs, it is possible to establish features of asset prices in this economy that hold not just for a particular calibration but for a whole family of driving stochastic processes. The most important such property is that CGFs are always convex. But I also find it helpful to introduce three nonparametric properties, each of which the CGF may or may not possess. The first is the exchangeability property, 6 which holds if c(θ 1 , θ 2 ) = c(θ 2 , θ 1 ).
This can be thought of as imposing a cet. par. assumption: it ensures the two countries have the same means and volatilities of output growth, the same arrival rates of jumps, and so on. It therefore focusses attention on the underlying economic mechanism and on the consequences of asymmetry in country size alone. The second is the convex difference property, which is a restriction on the higher cumulants of log output growth. It holds in the lognormal case, and more generally it ensures, roughly speaking, that output growth in each country is not positively skewed. The third is the linked fundamentals property. In the lognormal case, it is natural to consider imposing the economically plausible assumption that the correlation between the two countries' output growth is nonnegative. The linked fundamentals property, which is the appropriate generalization of this idea to arbitrary Lévy processes, requires that the CGF is supermodular.
I illustrate the results with parametric examples. The framework permits these to be flexibly specified; I assume that the log outputs have a correlated Brownian motion component with drifts µ i , volatilities σ i , i = 1, 2, and correlation κ. There are also two kinds of jumps. The first kind affects country i idiosyncratically. The second hits both countries simultaneously; the sizes of such jumps may or may not be correlated.
(2001) in the context of the forward premium puzzle, and by Backus, Chernov and Martin (2009) and Martin (2009b) in the context of disaster-based explanations of the equity-premium and riskless-rate puzzles.
6 Two random variables X 1 , X 2 are said to be exchangeable if the joint distribution of (X 1 , X 2 ) is the same as that of (X 2 , X 1 ).
Jumps arrive at times dictated by Poisson processes with arrival rates ω 1 and ω 2 for the idiosyncratic jumps, and ω for the simultaneous jumps. Jump sizes are lognormal:
when country i experiences an idiosyncratic jump, the size of that jump is lognormal with mean µ J,i and volatility σ J,i . When there is a simultaneous jump, the sizes of jumps in the two countries are jointly lognormal, with means ν i , volatilities τ i and correlation
ξ. The resulting CGF is
For notational convenience, let χ = (η − 1)/η and γ = (γ + χ − 1)/χ. The variable χ ranges between 0 (the Cobb-Douglas case) and 1 (the perfect substitutes case). I make the following assumptions:
Assumption 2 (Finiteness conditions). Tastes and technologies are such that
Typical estimates in the literature put both γ and η somewhere in the range 2-10, so Assumption 1 is very mild. Assumption 2 ensures that expected utility is finite, as I
show in the course of proving Result 2.
Prices, interest rates and expected returns
Price-dividend ratios, interest rates, expected returns, and the exchange rate depend on the relative sizes of the two countries. The appendix shows that country 1's share of world output denominated in common units,
used as the state variable for the economy. In some respects, though, it is more natural to use u t , a monotonic transformation of s t , as the state variable:
I express formulas in terms of u t , but plot graphs against the more easily interpreted s t . I drop subscripts when referring to the current (time-0) value of either variable, so s = s 0 and u = u 0 . If country 1 has a small share of output, s is small and u is large.
Result 1 (Exchange rate). The exchange rate e t can be expressed in terms of u t via
The expected appreciation in good 1's relative price, F X * 1 , is
and the expected appreciation in good 2's relative price, F X * 2 , is
The average expected appreciation, (F X * 1 + F X * 2 )/2, is positive-an example of Siegel's (1972) "paradox". country 1 in the consumption aggregator is w = 0.2, and the elasticity of substitution between goods is η = 2; and that the parameters governing technologies are, in the notation of (8),
.1, and ω = 0. I choose these parameter values to prove a clean illustration of the model because they ensure that countries have independent fundamentals and that the two countries have identically distributed output growth, so that any correlations or asymmetries that emerge are endogenous. The same calibration is used throughout the paper.
The next result provides integral formulas for the price-dividend ratios of the two countries' output claims and for the prices of perpetuities that deliver a unit of good i per unit of time. Since the integrands in these formulas decay exponentially fast, the integrals can be numerically evaluated effectively instantaneously.
The integrals can also be expressed in closed form-in terms of hypergeometric functions-if output growth is lognormal, as in Martin (2009a) .
Result 2 (Valuation ratios). The price-dividend ratios, P it /D it , of each country's output claim, and the perpetuities denominated in each good, B it , i = 1, 2, are given by
where
dv (16) and F (v) is defined in terms of the Beta function:
These valuation ratios move around over time as dividends, and hence u t and s t , move around. Figure 2b plots the price-dividend ratio of the claim to country 1's output stream, P 1 /D 1 , against country 1's output share, s. The solid line is the price-dividend ratio in the imperfect substitution case, using the same calibration as above, and the dashed line shows the price-dividend ratio in the perfect substitutes case.
The price-dividend ratio increases sharply as country 1's share of output declines in both the perfect and imperfect substitution cases, though the effect is muted in the latter case. To understand why, we must turn to the behavior of interest rates and risk premia.
Each good has its own set of zero-coupon bond prices, and attached to these bond prices are zero-coupon yields, which also move around over time, as shocks to the div-idends of the two trees induce changes in u. Three measures of interest rates 8 are particularly natural: the riskless rates for each good, calculated from zero-coupon yields in the limit as T ↓ 0; coupon yields on perpetuities, 1/B iT , provided by equations (14) and (15); and long rates, which are calculated from zero-coupon yields as T ↑ ∞.
Result 3 (Interest rates). Writing Y T,i ( u) for the continuously compounded T -period zero-coupon yield in i-units when the current state is u, we have
The riskless rates,
, are independent of u, hence constant over time:
8 These are "own-rates of interest"-a concept emphasized by Sraffa (1932) , who also provides a picturesque description of covered interest parity: "[W]e need not stretch our imagination and think of an organised loan market amongst savages bartering deer for beavers. Loans are currently made in the present world in terms of every commodity for which there is a forward market. When a cotton spinner borrows a sum of money for three months and uses the proceeds to purchase spot, a quantity of raw cotton which he simultaneously sells three months forward, he is actually 'borrowing cotton' for that period. The rate of interest which he pays, per hundred bales of cotton, is the number of bales that can be purchased with the following sum of money: the interest on the money required to buy spot 100 bales, plus the excess (or minus the deficiency) of the spot over the forward prices of the 100 bales."
In this notation, the currently prevailing one-year rate in country j, as discussed in Section 1, is i j,t = Y 1,j ( u). Figure 3a shows how the riskless rate (black solid line), perpetuity yield (red dashed line), and long rate (blue dotted line) depend on s. Riskless rates are low when s is close to 0 or to 1 due to precautionary savings demand in the face of an unbalanced-because poorly technologically diversified-economy, and high when s is close to 0.5. Country 1's yield curve can be upward-sloping (if its output share is close to 0 or to 1), downward-sloping (if its output share is close to about 0.45), or hump-shaped (for output shares close to 0.3 or to 0.6). Moreover, the figure is not symmetric: the interest rate in good 1 is higher when country 1 is small than when it is large. In this example, as country 1's share of global output declines to zero, its interest rate approaches 3.25% while the large country's interest rate drops to 1.18%. From the perspective of an investor (or economist) thinking in large country units, this might suggest the following carry trade: borrow at the large-country interest rate of 1.18%, and invest in the small-country interest rate of 3.25%.
We have not yet taken into account the effects of exchange-rate movements, however.
Before doing so, remember that in this example the exchangeability property holds:
Property 1 (Exchangeability). c(θ 1 , θ 2 ) = c(θ 2 , θ 1 ) for all θ 1 , θ 2 .
From Result 1, we know that (F X * 1 +F X * 2 )/2, is positive. But by the exchangeability property, we also know from equations (10) and (11) if the large country has bad news, the small country's exchange rate deteriorates, and the carry trade has a low return.
Returning to the general case, we can now see how the model generates the failure of uncovered interest parity in the regression (2). From equation (9) we see that, by construction, log e t+1 − log e t is independent of information known at time t, because u t inherits the independent increments property from the Lévy process that drives fundamentals. Therefore cov(log e t+1 − log e t , i 1,t − i 2,t ) = 0; combining this with the fact that var(i 1,t − i 2,t ) = 0, we have Result 4 (Failure of UIP). Within the model, plim(a 1 ) = 0 for generic calibrations.
That is, interest-rate differentials are totally uninformative about future movements of the exchange rate.
Given that the random walk nature of log e t+1 − log e t was hard-wired in, the interesting aspect of the model is not that it generates cov(log e t+1 − log e t , i 1,t − i 2,t ) = 0, but that interest rates can vary across countries, var(i 1,t − i 2,t ) = 0, despite the random walk character of exchange rates.
We can also interpret the failure of UIP in terms of forward rates. Define F 0→t to be the time-0 forward price of good 2 in 1-units, for settlement at t. A standard no-arbitrage argument implies that this forward exchange rate is determined by the spot exchange rate and t-period interest rates in the two countries: Figure 3b shows how the forward exchange rates F 0→t (black solid line) and 1/F 0→t (blue dotted line) compare to expected future spot exchange rates E e t and E 1/e t (red dashed line) in the numerical example. The starting share of country 1 is s = w = 0.2, so the current spot exchange rate is e 0 = 1. Since the example features symmetric output growth processes, expected future spot exchange rates (shown as a dashed red line) are the same from the perspective of both countries-E e t = E 1/e t -and they lie above the spot price (Siegel's paradox again). The forward price of good 2 is even higher than its expected future spot price, while the forward price of good 1 moves in the opposite direction to its expected future spot price, because interest rates are higher in country 1 than in country 2. This is another manifestation of the violation of UIP. The expected return, ER, on an asset with price P and instantaneous dividend D is
This expected return is calculated in the asset's own units. The expected return on 9 I plot Figure 3b in levels rather than in logs to show the limited quantitative importance of Siegel's paradox. In logs, Figure 3b would show expected appreciation of the log exchange rate equal to zero at all time horizons, and the lines depicting forward prices would fan out symmetrically around it.
asset 2 in units of country 1 is
The dividend yield component of expected returns is unit-free, but the expected capital gains component depends on exchange rate movements. To the extent that these are correlated with asset prices, there will be an associated risk premium.
Result 5 (Expected returns). Expected returns, ER α 1 ,α 2 ,λ 1 ,λ 2 ( u), are given by
and the values of α 1 , α 2 , λ 1 , λ 2 , which depend on the asset and reference units of interest, are provided in Table 1 .
Expected returns in 1-units Expected returns in 2-units Country 1's bond earns a risk premium in its own units because interest rates rise in bad times: if country 1 is small-s is small-then bad times correspond to bad news for country 2 and hence to a rise in s and (see Figure 3 ) country 1's riskless rate; and if country 1 is large-s is large-then bad times correspond to bad news for country 1, and hence to a decline in s and a rise in country 1's riskless rate. Thinking in foreign units, the sign of the risk premium on country 1's bonds depends on the size of country 1. If it is small, then the risk premium on country 1's bond is even larger, due to the relative price effects discussed above: bad states of the world are those in which country 2 has bad news, the relative supply of country 1's good increases, and its relative price declines. This poor performance in bad states makes country 1's bonds risky, so they require a sizeable risk premium. If, on the other hand, country 1 is large, then bad states of the world are associated with a decline in the relative supply of its own good, associated with a favorable exchange rate adjustment. That is, country 1's bond is a hedge, so it earns a negative risk premium. Figure 4b plots risk premia for asset 1 itself. In own units, the risk premium on asset 1 increases as country 1's output share-and hence its correlation with overall consumption-increases. In foreign units, the exchange rate effect described in the previous paragraph continues to operate, driving the risk premium up if country 1 is small, or down if country 1 is large.
The small-country limit
These complicated characterizations of riskless rates, price-dividend ratios, and expected returns simplify considerably in the small-country limit in which country 1 is very small and country 2 very large; the ability to take limits of the integral formulas is a major advantage of my analytical approach over the loglinearization approach. In the limit, several features of the model emerge more clearly, and those emphasized in the example above turn out to be characteristic of a whole family of possible calibrations.
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In this section, I assume that ρ − c(χ, 1 − χ − γ) > 0, so that the price-dividend ratio of each country's output claim is finite in the limit; 11 that R f,1 > 0 and R f,2 > 0, so that perpetuities have finite prices; and, strengthening Assumption 1, that γη > 2.
12
10 By a continuity argument, the strict inequalities presented in Results 7, 8 and 9 of this section also hold away from the limit point, so long as country 1 is sufficiently small relative to country 2. 11 Rather than merely for s ∈ (0, 1), as is ensured by previous assumptions. Strictly speaking, we could allow ρ − c(χ, 1 − χ − γ) < 0 so long as ρ − c(0, 1 − γ) > 0, because this is enough to ensure that the large country's output claim has a finite price-dividend ratio in the limit. But since this possibility was considered in detail in Martin (2009a) , where it was described as the supercritical case, and since it is harder for the inequalities ρ − c(χ, 1 − χ − γ) < 0 and ρ − c(0, 1 − γ) > 0 to hold simultaneously if χ is close to zero-that is, if imperfect substitution is an important factor-I rule it out for simplicity. 12 There is no real need for this last assumption; I make it because it seems uncontroversial, and
Result 6 (Asset pricing in the small-country limit). The yield curve is flat in both countries, and
Denominated in their own units, perpetuities are riskless, so do not earn a risk premium. But if returns are computed in foreign units, then a good-i perpetuity does earn a risk premium, written XS * B,i , where
Equations (23) and (24) can also be rewritten as XS *
The dividend yields on the output claims are
Excess returns denominated in own units, XS i , are given by
Excess returns denominated in foreign units, XS * i , are given by
The Gordon growth model holds:
G 2 ≡ c(0, 1) are the (log) mean growth rates of output in each country.
because it reduces the number of cases to consider in Results 7, 8 and 9.
In one sense, asset pricing in the large country is just closed-economy asset pricing: equations (22), (26) and (28) correspond directly to those derived in the one-tree economy of Martin (2009b) . But, for example, the risk premium on the large stock market in small-country units, given by equation (30), is a natural object of interest in a multi-country world that has no counterpart in a single closed economy.
To put these expressions in more familiar form, suppose that output growth is lognormal, and make the cet. par. assumption that the exchangeability property holds.
2 /2, where µ is the mean, σ the volatility, and κ the cross-country correlation of log output growth in the two countries, and we have
In the perfect substitutes case, χ = 1, there is no exchange-rate risk, so interest rates are equal in each country, bonds are riskless, and the small country's equity claim is risky only to the extent that its fundamentals are correlated with the large country's fundamentals. All this changes if the goods are imperfect substitutes (χ < 1). The interest rate is higher in the small than in the large country; the excess return on the small country's bond in large units is positive, while that on the large country's bond in small units is negative; and the small country's dividend yield increases, and its equity risk premium increases-particularly when denominated in foreign units-as exchangerate risk becomes important.
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Without the exchangeability assumption, the signs of most of these risk premia can be set arbitrarily even in the lognormal case (for example, by making the small country's output extremely volatile, and adjusting its correlation with the large country).
The only risk premium for which this is not true is that of the large country's equity claim denominated in large units, which is always positive.
14 To put some discipline on the model without making strong parametric assumptions, it is helpful to focus attention away from the details of the countries' output processes by assuming that the exchangeability property holds. We then have the following result.
Result 7 (Strong failure of UIP for the small country). Suppose Property 1 holds.
Then the interest rate in the small country is higher than the interest rate in the large
13 Although this particular example should not be taken too literally, it is interesting to note how the extra risk premia that are in principle observable in a two-country world permit the model's deep parameters to be easily identified. For example, observing equity premia in each country in own units (XS 1 and XS 2 ) together with the small country's bond and equity premia in large units (XS * B,1 and XS * 1 ) enables κ, γ, σ and χ to be identified. (This is not vacuous, since the equations are nonlinear.) Observing the riskless rate and dividend yield on either country's output claim would also enable ρ and µ to be identified.
14 In the lognormal case, this is obvious. Although it is no surprise that XS 2 > 0 in general, showing why it holds provides an illustration of how the convexity property of CGFs can be exploited. For,
, and note that (0, 1) and (0, −γ), considered as points in R 2 , are a "midpoint-preserving-spread" of (0, 1 − γ) and (0, 0). Convexity then implies that c(0, 1) + c(0, −γ) > c(0, 1 − γ) + c(0, 0), from which the result follows, given that c(0, 0) = 0. The proofs of the remaining results in this section repeatedly rely on arguments of this form.
country: R f,1 > R f,2 . But this higher interest rate is not offset by expected exchange rate movements. On the contrary, the expected appreciations in the relative price of each country's good are equal, and positive-Siegel's (1972) "paradox" once again. Thus uncovered interest parity (UIP) fails in a strong sense: not only do expected exchange rate movements not fully offset the small country's higher interest rate, they actually increase the expected return on the carry trade. That is, XS * B,1 > F X * 1 > 0.
The corresponding result for the large country relies on a property that restricts the behavior of the higher cumulants of output growth.
Property 2 (Convex differences). The CGF c(·, ·) has the convex difference property if
and (θ 1 + t, θ 2 + t) lie in the triangle ∆ ⊂ R 2 whose corners are at (1, 1), (1, −γ − 1)
and (−γ − 1, 1).
This property imposes a restriction that neither country has positively skewed log output growth. 15 It is satisfied if output growth is lognormal, or in disaster calibrations of the type suggested in Barro (2006) . In particular, it is satisfied in the numerical example presented in this paper. When it holds, the large country's bond earns a negative risk premium from the perspective of investors thinking in small-country units-a type of "exorbitant privilege" (Gourinchas and Rey (2007) , quoting Valéry Giscard d'Estaing).
Result 8 (An exorbitant privilege). Suppose Properties 1 and 2 hold. Then UIP also fails for the large country, which has the "exorbitant privilege" of paying a negative risk premium on its bonds in small-country units: XS * B,2 < 0.
15 If, for example, output growth is independent in the two countries, so that c(θ 1 , θ 2 ) can be expressed as c 1 (θ 1 ) + c 2 (θ 2 ), then it is equivalent to c i (θ i ) ≤ 0, i = 1, 2. In particular, c i (0) ≤ 0: that is, the third cumulant-skewness-cannot be positive.
Result 7 showed only that the riskless rate is higher in the small country than in the large country. Result 8 is stronger: it can be rephrased as saying that the (unfavorable) riskless rate differential faced by an investor who borrows at the small country's interest rate and invests at the large country's interest rate is sufficiently large that it overcomes the favorable expected exchange rate movement: R f,1 − R f,2 > F X * 2 . To characterize the risk premia on the two countries' output claims, I make a final assumption that the countries have linked fundamentals: in the lognormal case, for example, I want to rule out the possibility that the correlation between the two countries' output growth is negative so that the small country's output claim is a hedge. The following property turns out to be the appropriate way to capture this idea.
Property 3 (Linked fundamentals). The two countries have linked fundamentals if the CGF is supermodular:
By Topkis's (1978) Characterization Theorem, a sufficient condition for (31) is that
for all θ 1 and θ 2 in some open set containing ∆. It is immediate that the linked fundamentals property holds (with equality) if output growth is independent across countries.
In any given parametric example, it is easy to check whether (32) holds. In the lognormal 16 Vives (1990), Roberts (1990a, 1990b) , and Athey (2002) present various economic applications of supermodularity-in particular, to games with strategic complementarities. By Lemma 4 of Athey (2002), supermodularity of the CGF is implied by log-supermodularity of the probability density function of (y 1,t+1 − y 1,t , y 2,t+1 − y 2,t ); this provides another way of generating examples in which the linked fundamentals property holds.
case, (32) shows that the linked fundamentals property is equivalent to the correlation between the two countries' log output growth being nonnegative.
Result 9. Suppose Properties 1, 2 and 3 hold. Then there is a critical value η * ∈
(1, ∞)-where η * = 2 in the lognormal case-such that
We also have XS * B,1 ≤ XS *
. If the countries have strictly linked fundamentals
17 and η is sufficiently large then we have a total ordering of risk premia:
Result 9 extends the model's predictions regarding bond risk premia to risky assets.
The excess return on the small country's output claim is greater in large-country units than in own units; and vice versa for the large country's asset. If the goods of the two countries are sufficiently poor substitutes (η < η * ), then currency risk is so dominant that the risk premium on the small country's output claim is greater in large units than is the risk premium on the large country's claim in small units-even though the small country contributes a negligible proportion of the representative agent's consumption.
Conclusion
The logic of this paper rests on a fundamental asymmetry: the representative agent cares more about the large country than the small country, since it provides a larger share of consumption. As a result, when the large country has bad news the relative price of its output increases, while the relative price of the small country's output decreases. As a 17 That is, if the inequality (31) is strict.
result, interest rates differ across countries. Since, by construction, the (log) exchange rate follows a random walk, UIP fails in any nondegenerate calibration.
In the small-country limit, some of the complications of the model evaporate, leaving behind the central intuition. It is then possible to characterize how UIP fails across whole families of possible calibrations that satisfy some rather general nonparametric restrictions on the cumulant-generating function. If, say, the random variables driving output growth in the two countries are exchangeable-loosely speaking, if the two countries have symmetric, but not necessarily independent, output growth distributions-then the small country's exchange rate is expected to appreciate. Even so, its bonds are riskier, and so earn a higher interest rate, than the large country's bonds. 
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A Appendix
Recall the notation χ = (η − 1)/η and γ = (γ + χ − 1)/χ, and let y 1t ≡ y 1t + [(1 − χ)/χ] log w and y 2t ≡ y 2t + [(1 − χ)/χ] log(1 − w). We also defined the state variable
. This definition implies that u t = χ( y 2t − y 1t ).
The consumption aggregator can be expressed as C t = e χb y 10 +χe y 1t + e χb y 20 +χe y 2t
and the price of good 2 in 1-units is
If η = ∞-the perfect substitutes case-then χ = 1 so e t is constant. If, on the other hand, η = 1, then C t is a Cobb-Douglas aggregator of the two goods so that
. It is easy to check that this implies that the price-dividend ratio of each asset is constant. Here I assume that η ∈ (1, ∞). From (6), the (unit-free) price-dividend ratio of good 1 is
where γ ≡ (γ + χ − 1)/χ. So,
[e χb y 10 +χe y 1t + e χb y 20 +χe
and similarly, the price (in own units) of a zero-coupon bond that pays a unit of good 1 at time t is
A perpetuity, or consol, that pays a constant stream of good 1, at rate 1 per unit time is just a portfolio of zero-coupon bonds, so integrating the above expression over t, we find the perpetuity price (which can also be thought of as a price-dividend ratio, since the dividend is fixed at 1 unit of the good)
Correspondingly, the price-dividend ratio of asset 2 is
and the price, in 2-units, of the t-period zero-coupon good-2 bond is
so the price-dividend ratio of the good-2 perpetuity is
Equations (36)- (41) each feature an expectation of the form
where the values of α 1 and α 2 corresponding to the various assets are given in Table 2 . Next, we can take care of the numerator inside the expectation by making a change of measure. Define a new measure implicitly, via
and note, for later, that e e c(θ 1 ,θ 2 )t ≡ Ee
In terms of this new measure, (42) is 
where i is the complex number √ −1 and
defines F (v) in terms of the Euler beta function. Applying this, we find that
Interchanging the integral and expectation operator,
where u ≡ χ( y 20 − y 10 ).
The generic expression we want to evaluate is 
using (46) and assuming ρ−c [χ(α 1 − γ/2), χ(α 2 − γ/2)] > 0, which in turn ensures that Martin (2009a) ).
Proof of Result 1: For arbitrary constants w 1 and w 2 ,
The result follows by applying (48) to equation (9), using the definition of u; the final statement is an application of Jensen's inequality.
Proof of Result 3:
Using the preceding results in equations (37) and (40), we have
The zero-coupon yields follow immediately; and using l'Hôpital's rule to take the limit as t ↓ 0, the riskless rate expressions follow too.
To calculate long rates, we use the method of steepest descent. In the case of the long rate in 1-units, which is
we are interested in a stationary point of ρ − c[
considered as a function of v ∈ C. If v = ix is pure imaginary, this function is concave when considered as a function of x ∈ R (Martin (2009a)), so has a stationary point at some ix * , x * ∈ R. If |x * | < γ/2 then the contour of integration can be continuously deformed to pass through the stationary point without crossing a pole. It follows by the method of steepest descent that
If, on the other hand, the stationary point occurs for x * > γ/2, then there is a residue to take into account at v = ( γ/2)i; it turns out that
Similarly, if the stationary point occurs at
These cases can be summarized by writing
By exchangeability, the long rate in 2-units is
which can also be rewritten as
Proof of Result 4:
A proof was provided in the text.
Proof of Result 5:
The dividend yield component of the expected return is the reciprocal of the valuation ratio, so it remains to calculate EdP/P .
The general problem we face has
where α 1 , α 2 , λ 1 , λ 2 vary from asset to asset and are supplied in Table 1 . This can be rewritten as
so using (48), we find that EdP equals γ m Dividing EdP by P and rearranging, the result follows, after defining G α 1 ,α 2 ,λ 1 ,λ 2 ( u) to 
